ABSTRACT The smart grid is the next generation power grid with bidirectional communications between the electricity users and the providers. Demand response management is vital in the smart grid to reduce power generation costs as well as to lower the users' electricity bills. In this paper, we introduce multiple fossil-fuel and multiple renewable energy sources-based utility companies on the supply side, and propose an end-user oriented utility company selection scheme to minimize user costs. We formulate the problem as a game, incorporating the uncertainty associated with the power supply of the renewable sources, and prove that there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game. To further reduce users' costs, we develop a joint scheme by integrating shiftable load scheduling with utility company selection. We model the joint scheme also as a game, and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the game. For both schemes, we propose distributed algorithms for the users to find the equilibrium of the game using only local information. We evaluate our schemes and compare their performances to two other approaches. The results show that our joint utility company selection and shiftable load scheduling scheme incurs the least cost to the users.
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart grid is an intelligent electricity network that makes use of advanced information, control, and communication technologies to save energy, reduce cost and enhance reliability and transparency of the grid [1] , [2] . The realization of the smart grid is geared by the goal of effective management of power supply and demand loads. Demand response (DR) is the response system of the end-users to manage their consumption of electricity in response to supply conditions. Demand response management (DRM) smooths out the system power demand profile across time and provides shortterm reliability benefits as it can offer load relief to resolve system and/or local capacity constraints. Thus, from the operator aspect, DRM reduces the cost of operating the grid, while from the user aspect it lowers their bills. In the smart grid, bidirectional communications between energy providers and end users will greatly enhance DR capabilities of the whole system. E.g., consumers will be able to control and manage their electricity usage, and the providers can plan and manage the generation and supply of power in a more structured and efficient manner. Thus, power generation, distribution and consumption are envisaged to be more efficient, more economical and more reliable in the smart grid.
The smart grid aims to incorporate components such as renewable energy sources, distributed micro-generators and energy storage entities like plug-in electric vehicles and batteries. With internationalization of the energy market and the incorporation of new renewable energy sources (e.g., wind and solar power) in the smart grid, users will have more options in terms of choosing providers or the type of energy they use. With this motivation, we include multiple renewable energy sources on the supply side, in addition to the traditional fossil-fuel based sources. While existing literature has focused mainly on minimizing the power generation cost of a single provider or utility company (UC) by scheduling the shiftable load of the end-users to different time-slots, we introduce a utility company selection (UCS) approach for DRM, to minimize the costs of the users, considering the uncertainty about the states of the renewable energy sources. To this end, in order to reduce the costs of the users further, we develop a joint scheme by combining UCS and conventional shiftable load scheduling (SLS) schemes. This joint scheme is very generic, and is useful for residential, commercial as well as industrial electricity consumers.
The cost for a user depends not only on its own demand and scheduling, but also on the demands and scheduling of other users, who choose the same UC. Moreover, in a multiple UC scenario which is the focus of this paper, the cost for each user varies according to the cost of power generation of many sources, and the selection of the UC by other users, thus making the interactions between users and sources, and among users, complicated. This complicated coupling makes game theory an appealing approach to model users' costs in this scenario. The users schedule their demands by optimally choosing the UCs and by optimally scheduling their shiftable appliances in order to minimize their payments to the providers. We model these interactions among the users as games, and we characterize the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution of the games.
Our contributions in this work are as follows. 1) We study DRM with multiple UCs with a user-centric approach, incorporating uncertainty regarding power supply from the renewable energy sources. 2) We propose a UC selection game among users, and develop a distributed algorithm to find the NE of the game using only local information. 3) We introduce a joint UC selection and load scheduling game, to further improve the users' costs, and propose a distributed algorithm to reach the NE of the game. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Related work is described in Section II. The system model that includes the generator availability model and the cost model, is described in Section III. In Section IV, we introduce a utility company selection game among the users and design a distributed algorithm for the game to converge to the NE. In Section V, we develop a joint scheme by integrating shiftable load scheduling with the utility company selection scheme, and propose a distributed algorithm to find the NE of the game using only local information. In Section VI we present and discuss our results and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several studies on DRM in the smart grid [3] - [7] . In [3] , the authors formulated the energy consumption scheduling problem as a game among the consumers for increasing and strictly convex cost functions. In [4] , the authors considered a distributed system where price is modeled by its dependence on the overall system load. Based on the price information, the users adapt their demands to maximize their own utilities. In [5] , a robust optimization problem was formulated to maximize the utility of a consumer, taking into account price uncertainties at each hour. In [6] , the authors have exploited the awareness of the end-users and proposed a method to aggregate and manage end-users' preferences to maximize energy efficiency and user satisfaction. In [7] , a dynamic pricing scheme was proposed to incentivize customers to achieve an aggregate load profile suitable for providers, and the demand response problem was investigated for different levels of information sharing among the consumers in the smart grid. We observe that [3] - [7] mainly focus on either only one source or a number of sources/providers treated as one entity, and the cost minimization problem was solved from the provider's perspective. Differently in our study, we include multiple renewable and non-renewable energy sources based UCs, and we focus on minimizing the cost for each user. We notice that there are few studies exploring DRM in the context of multiple energy sources, incorporating renewable energy sources on the supply side [10] , [12] . However, these two studies also treat the sources as parts of a single entity, and are also based on the cost minimization of the supply side.
In our previous work [8] , we introduced multiple UCs who aim to maximize their revenues, and multiple consumers who aim to maximize their utilities. In [8] , we focused our analysis on a static one time-slot game. In this paper, we deploy a pricing scheme that is closely related to the cost of power generation, and we also introduce the temporal aspect of DRM in the joint scheme.
Recently there has been a drastic increase in the volume of work considering batteries as storage devices, or solar panels at buildings to reduce the peak-to-average ratio of power demand, and thus the cost for the users [14] , [15] . The problem we address in this paper is different. When each user has a battery or a solar panel, these alternatives are local for each user. In our study, the renewable energy sources are on the supply side and the same renewable sources can supply power to multiple users, which makes the problem more complicated. Moreover, there has been an increasing interest in integrating renewable energy sources into the grid with storage units [16] , [17] . Our focus in this paper is different than the analyses in [16] and [17] . While [16] , [17] focus on the integration issues of renewable sources into the grid, we concentrate our analysis on the market level and provide user-centric solutions to get economic benefits by making optimal choices. Fig. 1 shows the system model. There are N energy users, N := {1, 2, ....., N }, and K different UCs, K := {1, 2, ....., K }. Some of the UCs provide electricity from fossil-fuel based sources, and some UCs are based on renewable energy sources. Then, we have, K = K f + K r , where K f and K r are the number of fossil-fuel based UCs and renewable energy based UCs, respectively. The fossil-fuel based sources are available all the time but the price charged to the users by the corresponding UCs will include the cost due to their pollution emission. On the other hand, the renewable energy sources are pollution free but they cannot provide a stable supply of power.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The daily energy consumption schedule of each user is divided into different time-slots. Each user intends to select the UC that minimizes the cost it pays to the UCs. In each time-slot, each user can select only one UC, but in case of deficit power from a renewable energy based UC, the demand will be served by using another generator. There is bidirectional communication between the providers and the consumers. The consumers form a Neighborhood Area Network (NAN). The data from the users' side (total demand from each UC), and from the supply side (price) is exchanged through the Neighborhood Area Network Gateway (NAN-GW) as shown in Figure 1 . Users can communicate through a Local Area Network (LAN), as described in [3] .
In the current power system and the electricity market, the interactions among the generators, energy service providers/UCs, transmission companies (transcos), distribution network operator (DNO), distribution system operator (DSO), etc. are quite complex. Although our model might be simplified in this respect, since the transmission and distribution costs are normally fixed, the market price and the consumer-demands are mainly affected by the generation costs from the supply side and consumers' parameters from the demand side. Thus our model leads to simplified decision problems, which allows detailed analysis and yields some useful insights into the interactions, without losing generality of the grid structure. Moreover, considerable volume of work has used this kind of scenario with electricity consumers and providers/UCs interacting with each other without including transcos, DNOs, DSOs, etc. [3] , [18] - [20] , in the context of DRM in the smart grid.
There are two components associated with the price charged by a UC to the consumers: the cost of power generation and the availability of the renewable energy sources.
A. COST OF POWER GENERATION
We choose the cost function of each UC such that the following properties are satisfied for both fossil-fuel based and renewable energy based UCs. 
Property 2: The cost functions and hence the prices charged to the users are strictly convex in any time-slot, i.e.,
k,tot ≥ 0, and 0 < θ < 1 is any real number.
Examples of cost functions that satisfy these properties can be the two-step conservation rate model, quadratic cost function, etc. These types of cost functions are of significant importance and are realistic too, since they have been deployed by many big power plants such as BC Hydro [9], and they can be closely related to the cost of power generation. Hence, we employ a quadratic cost function for the UCs.
Let the coefficients of UC k for the cost of power generation be β k,2,p , β k,1,p and β k,0,p , respectively. Let the pollution coefficients be α k,2 , α k,1 and α k,0 , respectively. Then
n denote the demand of user n at time-slot h, h ∈ H, where H := {1, 2, . . . , H }. Let g n := {g h n,k , k ∈ K, h ∈ H}, denote the UCS strategy of user n, where g h n,k is the decision of user n for UC k in time-slot h, i.e., 
We use vectors g h n to represent the strategy of user n for timeslot h, i..e., g h n := {g h n,k , k ∈ K}. Suppose user n prefers UC k in time-slot h. Let N h k := {1, 2, . . . , N h k }, denote the set of users who select UC k, where 
B. AVAILABILITY OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
When renewable energy sources such as wind power and solar power are incorporated into the system, uncertainty is added to the supply side. We employ a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) to model the power available from the renewable energy based UCs. Although the choice of the DTMC model is motivated by mathematical tractability as it facilitates the derivation of the structure of the optimal strategies for the games, it is able to satisfactorily represent the transition between different states as has been shown by [21] and [22] for wind power, and by [23] - [25] for solar radiation. Moreover, DTMC has been extensively used to model the availability of different kinds of renewable energy sources [10] , [24] - [26] .
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The users do not know the exact state of the renewable energy sources, but they have knowledge about the statistical behavior of the renewable energy based UCs, i.e., the only information the users have access to, is the steady state probabilities of the DTMC. The availability of the renewable energy based UCs is represented as an M state DTMC as shown in Fig. 2 . Let the state of the renewable
Each state of a UC represents its power supply level. The power supply state space can be divided into M discrete levels i.e.,
) represent the power supply state of all renewable energy based UCs, i.e., the system state in time-slot h. Then, the state space of this vector is
If the UCs are independent, the dynamics of s h follows DTMC with transition probability from state vector ω to ω , given by
where ω k and ω k are the k th element of the state vector ω and ω , respectively, and P k (ω k , ω k ) represents the state transition probability matrix of UC k. For a time homogeneous DTMC model, the steady state probabilities of renewable energy based UC k, (k ∈ K r ), being in state m at time t can be obtained as follows. Let us define
Then, π
where π k is a row vector. The stationary distribution is
If π k exists, it can be obtained by solving
C. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN UTILITY COMPANIES AND USERS
Each residential user has a smart meter that, with the aid of bidirectional communication, can perform load scheduling and UCS optimally in order to minimize the cost for the user. The data communication between the supply and demand sides is carried out through a NAN-GW as shown in Fig. 1 .
IV. UTILITY COMPANY SELECTION: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH
Different users choose the UCs independently. However, the aim of each user is to minimize the cost that it pays to the UCs. In this section, we discuss the pricing scheme, i.e., the cost model for the users, and formulate the UCS game among the users, for which, we show that a Nash equilibrium (NE) solution exists. Then, we present a distributed algorithm to reach a NE and prove that the algorithm converges to a NE.
A. PRICING MECHANISM: COST MODEL FOR USERS
In [3] , the authors showed that charging each user in proportion to its demand leads to minimizing the cost of the single UC when each user schedules its demands to minimize its own charges. Thus, in order to motivate the users to help in the demand side management, the providers employ a pricing scheme such that the consumers are charged according to the cost of generating the required power, as in [3] . If a user selects a fossil-fuel based UC k ∈ K f , in time-slot h, i.e., if g h n,k = 1, the price charged to the user for time-slot h will be
If a user chooses a renewable energy based UC but the source is not available or if the power supply level of the UC is not adequate to meet the demand, the total available power is supplied proportionally to the users' demands. The amount of power that can not be supplied by the source (deficit power) will have to be generated by and bought from either a source that can immediately generate the deficit power, or from a reserve. In either case, the power from this additional source (backup source) is normally costlier than the power from the committed units. We consider a quadratic cost function for this additional source too, and denote the coefficients of its cost function as β res,2 , β res,1 and β res,0 .
Let p h k,m k denote the steady state probability of the renewable energy based UC k, k ∈ K r , being in state m k , m k ∈ M. The steady state probabilities are obtained from
be the available power of UC k in time-slot h if it is in state m k . Then, the VOLUME 5, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2017 amount of power supplied by UC k is
The average supply of renewable energy based UC k is
If a user chooses renewable energy based UC k, k ∈ K r , in time-slot h i.e. if g h n,k = 1, then, the amount of power that it gets from k is
The amount of power that user n gets, averaged over all the states of UC k is
If the demand from the renewable energy based UC in timeslot h is higher than the available power in state m k , the deficit power for user n will be
The average deficit for user n will be
The total amount of deficit power for renewable energy based
The deficit power for all renewable sources k ∈ K r , which are in states m 1 , m 2 , . . . m K r , respectively, is supplied by an extra source such as a gas turbine, which can generate the shortage power immediately. The total amount of power to be supplied by the extra source is
Using (13) and the steady-state probabilities in each time-slot, we can compute the total deficit power from all UCs averaged over all the states of all the renewable energy based UCs as
Therefore, if user n chooses renewable energy based UC k in time-slot h, the price charged to the user will be
where N res is the total number of users whose deficit powers are served by the additional generator. Note that the above formulation can easily accommodate the scenario with more than one kind of backup sources. In this scenario, a possible approach is to choose the cheapest type of backup generator if it can make up the deficit, otherwise multiple generators supply the deficit power.
B. UTILITY COMPANY SELECTION GAME AMONG USERS
The centralized cost minimization problem for users can be written as
where P k,max is the capacity of fossil-fuel based UC k, k ∈ K f . Since, each user is selfish, the objective of each user is to minimize its own cost. The optimization problem for user n given the strategies of the other users, (OP user,n ) is
For the UCS game, the power consumptions and thus the costs are decoupled in time. Hence, minimizing the total price over a time span of H time-slots is equivalent to minimizing the price in each time-slot, i.e., (OP user,n ) takes the form
The choice of UCs by consumers depends not only on their own demands but also on the demands and UCS strategies of the other consumers. This implies that the strategy of each user is coupled with the strategies of the other users. As each user is concerned about maximizing its own payoff, game theory [11] is a natural fit to model the behavior of the users in this case. The components of the game are as follows:
• Players: Users in the set N .
• Strategies: The strategy set of user n is the selection of UCs for all time-slots in a day, g n . The strategy space is defined as g := {g 1 × g 2 × . . . g N }.
• Payoffs: u user,n (g n , g −n ), for each user n ∈ N , where u user,n (g n , g −n ) = −C user,n (g n , g −n ), and g −n is the strategy of all users other than n.
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C. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
For a finite N -user game, a NE is a solution at which a player cannot improve its payoff by deviating alone from the equilibrium, given the strategies of all other players. For the UCS game, the NE is any strategy set (g * n , g * −n ) at which u user,n (g * n , g * −n ) ≥ u user,n (g n , g * −n ), ∀n ∈ N , where g * n is the optimal UCS strategy of user n, for given optimal strategies of other users g * −n , and u user,n (.) = −C user,n (.). Theorem 1: The UCS game between the consumers is a concave N -user game and a Nash equilibrium exists for the game.
Proof: For the UCS game for one whole day, since there is no coupling in time, it is sufficient to prove that an NE exists for the game for each time-slot.
For time-slot h, the demand of user n from UC k can be written as
If k is a renewable energy based UC, user n will get S h avl,user,n from k, and S h def,user,n from the corresponding additional source. The demand of users other than n who also prefer UC k, can be represented
Let us write the payoff of user n, who gets power from UC k,
). Since the cost functions are increasing and strictly convex for each UC, the payoff function
) and is continuous in d h all,k . This holds for all users n ∈ N , who prefer a different UC k ∈ K, k = k, too. Thus, the UCS game is a concave N -user game. An NE exists for a concave N -user game [13] . The game will be a concave game even if a part of the demand of user n from k ∈ K r , is supplied by the additional generator, since the sum of the convex functions is also convex. Consequently, an NE exists for this game.
D. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM TO CONVERGE TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Equation (16)- (17) can be solved in a centralized manner by using convex programming techniques such as the interior point method (IPM). Nonetheless, a solution that can be implemented and updated autonomously to accommodate the changes within the demand side, is of arguably higher value compared to a centralized solution. We are therefore interested in presenting a distributed solution for (16)- (17) . Notably, (18) or (19) can be solved by each user locally provided the users can select their strategies sequentially. Exploiting this fact, next, we propose a distributed algorithm to implement the UCS scheme.
Let, g n,t = {g h n,t , h ∈ H} denote the UCS strategy of user n. Each user starts by randomly selecting a UC for each time-slot. In the next iteration, one of the consumers solves the local optimization problem (19) , ∀h ∈ H, and updates its strategy for the whole day. Then, another user gets its turn to solve its local optimization problem and to update its choice. If in one complete round of updating, the selection of UCs from all users do not change, the point is an equilibrium. We call this user-centric algorithm, Algorithm 1. The strategy update iterations should be performed until the strategies of all users do not change compared to their strategies in the previous iteration. Note that strategy updates should be done in such a way that no two users update at the same time. The NAN-GW can be used to send the control signal (e.g., a 1-bit signal) for giving turn to each user to update its strategies. Users' strategies can be updated randomly, thus making the optimal strategies independent of the order of their turns. The details are presented in Algorithm 1. Note that the term iteration 't' and the term time-slot 'h' are used to represent different time scales. An optimal UCS game for one time-slot needs many iterations for the users' strategy to converge (see results in Section VI).
Algorithm 1 : Distributed Algorithm for NE 1: t=1; Arbitrarily choose g n,t = {g h n,t , h ∈ H}, ∀n ∈ N , and announce the starting {g n,t , n ∈ N }. 2: t = t + 1 3: Randomly choose user n, n ∈ N . 4: User n: Solve optimization problem (19) , ∀h ∈ H to find optimal g n,t . 5: If g n,t changes compared to g n,t−1 , 6: Send a control message to announce the new g n,t
to other smart meters. 7: end 8: If any user has not updated its strategy for iteration t, 9: Send a control message to user l who has not updated its strategy for iteration t, l ∈ N , l = n. 10: Update n = l. User n, go to Step 4. 11: end 12: If g n,t changes for at least one user, 13: Go to Step 2. 14: end Theorem 2: Algorithm 1 converges to an NE as long as no two users update their strategies at the same time.
Proof: Line 4 in Algorithm 1 finds the best response. If users play the best responses using this algorithm in a sequential manner, the cost for each user decreases or remains unchanged every time a user updates its strategy. However, the cost cannot decrease below a certain value since C user,n ≥ 0. This implies that the algorithm converges to a fixed point, beyond which the cost can not be improved, for given strategies of other users. To prove that this fixed point is an NE, let us denote C * user,n (g * n , g * −n ) as the cost for user n at the fixed point, which corresponds to the strategy set (g * n , g * −n ) and let C user,n (g n , g * −n ) be the cost for the same user for the strategy set (g n , g * −n ) where g * n = g n . By definition, if (g * n , g * −n ) is a fixed point of the UCS game, then,
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Thus, the fixed point (g * n , g * −n ) is an NE of the game. If the NE is unique, the algorithm converges to the unique NE. If the game possesses multiple Nash equilibria, the algorithm converges to one of them depending on the initially selected strategies.
V. LOAD SCHEDULING AND UTILITY COMPANY SELECTION: A JOINT APPROACH
Scheduling in time is a conventional approach used to reduce the Peak to Average Ratio (PAR) of a single UC which consequently reduces the cost of generation for the (single) UC and also the cost for the users. However, it should be noted that not all users prefer saving on their bills by shifting their flexible load. Such time-scheduling schemes are useful only for those users who have a considerable amount of flexible load. In fact, many consumers may not even have any shiftable load, or they may have some flexible appliances but they may prefer to use them at certain hours rather than scheduling them at any time for the sake of reducing costs. In addition, the electricity requirements of the commercial and the industrial consumers are usually rather strict, and scheduling in time may not be a preferable option for them. On the contrary, if the users have shiftable appliances, their costs can be reduced significantly by scheduling their shiftable appliances in different timeslots. We accommodate the needs and goals of all these types of consumers together into one framework in our proposed DRM solution. To this end, we introduce a joint scheme where users schedule their shiftable appliances in different timeslots and also choose UCs in each time-slot.
As mentioned in Section I, we would like to emphasize that the UCS scheme incorporating the uncertainty in the supply side associated with the renewable energy resources, is one of our main contributions in this paper. The joint scheme is another contribution of this work which further reduces the cost for the users. The joint scheme is not a straightforward extension of the UCS game. The joint scheme is comprised of two levels of games: the optimal SLS in time for the whole day and the optimal UCS for all time-slots in a day. It is worth noting that the two scenarios have rather different application domains. The UCS game finds its extensive use in a scenario where the end-users have relatively strict power requirements such as commercial and/or industrial users who have either no or very little flexible demands. On the other hand, the scheduling in time is more useful for users with higher proportion of shiftable appliances, such as residential users. The joint scheme is very generic and is suitable for residential, commercial as well as industrial users.
In addition to a non-shiftable demand in each time-slot, we now incorporate some shiftable power requirement for each consumer. Let d h n,ns , d h n,s be the non-shiftable demand in timeslot h, and part of the shiftable demand of user n, scheduled in time-slot h, respectively, for a given scheduling in time. Here, the subscript s represents shiftable, n is the user index and ns indicates non-shiftable. The total amount of shiftable power per day is fixed but its scheduling in time and the selection of UCs is the strategy of each consumer in this case.
We incorporate the coupling among different time-slots for the shiftable load of consumer n as
where τ n,1 , τ n,2 are the beginning and the end time-slots, respectively, for the shiftable demand of user n.
A. PRICING MECHANISM: COST MODEL FOR USERS
For this scheme, the strategy of each consumer is {x n , g n }, where {x n } := {x h n , h ∈ H}, is a demand scheduling vector that incorporates its shiftable loadd n,s , i.e., x h n = d h n,ns + d h n,s , is the power requirement of user n in time-slot h, and g n := {g h n,k , h ∈ H, k ∈ K} is the UCS strategy of user n for one complete day, for a given schedule of the shiftable appliances. If a user selects a fossil-fuel based UC k ∈ K f , in time-slot h, the price charged to the user for time-slot h will be
If a user chooses renewable energy based UC k in timeslot h, the price charged to user n is calculated as follows. The amount of power supplied by UC k, if it is in state m k , is
where S h avl, UC,k,m k is the corresponding available power of UC k in state m k . The amount of power that user n gets from UC k is
If the demand from the renewable energy based UC k in timeslot h is higher than the available power in state m k , the deficit power for user n will be
The average supply of UC k (S h supp, UC,k ), the average power that user n gets from it (S h avl, user,n ), and the average deficit for user n (S h def, user,n ), can be obtained using (21) in (9), (22) in (10), and (23) in (12), respectively.
The total deficit power for renewable energy based UC k in time-slot h if the source is in state m k , is
The total amount of power to be generated by the extra source to supply the deficit power for all the renewable sources when the UCs are in states m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m K r , is
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denoted by S h def, tot,{m 1 ,...m Kr } , and can be calculated by substituting (24) into (13) . Similarly, the total deficit power for all renewable energy based UCs averaged over all the states can be obtained by using S h def, tot,{m 1 ,...m Kr } in (14) . Therefore, if user n chooses renewable energy based UC k in time-slot h, the price charged to the user will be 
B. UTILITY COMPANY SELECTION AND SHIFTABLE LOAD SCHEDULING GAME AMONG USERS
The objective for a centralized approach would be to minimize the total daily cost for all users i.e.,
The objective of each user, is to minimize its own cost given the strategy of other users, i.e., the optimization problem for user n (OP user,n ) in this case, is
In the UCS game, the coupling of the strategies was only in terms of the selected UCs. There was no coupling in time. In the joint UCS and SLS game, although the UCs are chosen for each time-slot in an independent manner, since each consumer also optimizes its choice of the UCs based on the scheduling of its shiftable load, the strategies of the consumers are thus coupled in both time and the UCs. We design the interactions as a joint game in this case, where the players are the consumers: N , the strategies are {x n , g n }, ∀n ∈ K, and their payoffs are u user,n (x n , g n , x −n , g −n ) = −C user,n (x n , g n , x −n , g −n ).
C. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
For the joint UCS and SLS game, the NE is defined as the strategy set {x * := {x * n , x * −n }, g * := {g * n , g * −n }} such that
Theorem 3:
The joint UCS and SLS game is a concave N -user game and a Nash equilibrium exists for this game.
Proof:
The payoff is given by the function u user,n (x, g) = u user,n ({x 1 , . . . , x n , . . . , x N k }, {g 1 , . . . , g n ,  . . . , g N k }) for user n, where (x 1 , . . . , x n , . . . x N k ) and  (g 1 , . . . , g n , . . . g N k ) are the vectors that represent the demands and the UCS of users 1, . . . , n, . . . , N k , all of whom get power from UC k, (k ∈ K, here k may indicate different UCs at different time-slots).
For a given scheduling of the shiftable load of the users, an NE exists for the UCS game for each time-slot, as shown in Section IV-C. Thus we need to prove that an NE exists only for the scheduling game.
Since the cost function of each UC is increasing and strictly convex, the payoff function u user,n (x n , x −n ) is strictly concave w.r.t. x n . For x n ∈ x, where x = x 1 × x 2 × . . . × x N k , u user,n (x) is continuous in x and is concave in x n for given  (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , x n+1 , . . . , x N k ) . This holds for all users n ∈ N selecting different time-slots h ∈ H for their load scheduling from the same UC. Hence, the load scheduling game is a concave N -user game and the existence of an NE for such a game is straightforward [13] .
D. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM TO FIND NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Problem (26)- (28) can be solved in a centralized setting by using convex programming techniques such as IPM. Notably, (29) represents a local optimization problem for each user given the strategies of other users. Therefore, each user can reach the NE of the game starting from some arbitrary initial selection vectors {x n , g n }. We devise a user-centric distributed algorithm for each user to solve (29) locally in order to find its optimal strategy.
Each user starts with a random scheduling of the shiftable appliances and by randomly selecting a generator, for each time-slot. To start the next iteration, a 1-bit control information is sent to one of the users by the NAN-GW to update its strategy. The user who gets the control signal solves the local optimization problem (29) for given {x −n , g −n } and updates its strategy {x n , g n }. Then, another user is chosen randomly to update its strategy. The process stops when the strategies of all users ({x n , g n , n ∈ N }) do not change. The details are presented in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4: Algorithm 2 converges to an NE as long as the updating of the individual strategies is done sequentially.
Proof: Line 4 in Algorithm 2 finds the best response. If users play the best responses sequentially (at random turns) using this algorithm, the cost for each user decreases or remains unchanged every time a user updates its strategy. However, the cost cannot decrease below a certain value because C user,n ≥ 0. This implies that the algorithm converges to a fixed point. Let us denote C * user,n (x * n , x * −n , g * n , g * −n ) as the cost for user n at the fixed point, which corresponds to the strategy space {x * n , x * −n , g * n , g * −n } and let C user,n (x n , x * −n , g n , g * −n ) be the cost for the same user for the strategy space {x n , x * −n , g n , g * −n } where {x * n = x n , g * n = g n }. By definition, if (x n , x * −n , g * n , g * −n ) is a fixed point of the game, then,
This implies that the fixed point (x * n , x * −n , g * n , g * −n ) is an NE of the game. If the NE is unique, the algorithm converges to Arbitrarily choose x n,t = {x h n,t }, g n,t = {g h n,t }, ∀h ∈ H, such that (27), (28) is satisfied ∀n ∈ N , and announce the initial {x n,t , g n,t , n ∈ N }. 2: t = t + 1 3: Randomly choose user n, n ∈ N . 4: User n: Solve (29) to find optimal {x n,t , g n,t } for given strategies of other users. 5: If {x n,t , g n,t } changes compared to {x n,t−1 , g n,t−1 }, 6: Send a control message to announce the new {x n,t , g n,t } to other smart meters. 7: end 8: If any user has not updated its strategy for iteration t, 9: Send a control message user l who has not updated its strategy for iteration t, l ∈ N , l = n. 10: Update n = l. User n, go to Step 4. 11: end 12: If {x n,t g n,t } changes compared to {x n,t−1 , g n,t−1 } for at least one user, 13: Go to Step 2. 14: end the unique NE. If there exists multiple Nash equilibria, the algorithm converges to one of them depending on the initially selected strategies.
If the energy consumption needs of all users are the same for different days, theorems 3 and 4 imply that starting from any initial point, Algorithm 2 converges to an optimal UCS and SLS solution for each day, without having to recalculate the solution every day. If however, the energy consumption needs for the users are different for different days, then Algorithm 2 will converge to different optimal UCS and SLS solutions for different days. We note that even in the later case, the optimal solutions can be computed at least a day before as long as the users know their total demands and the shiftable demands for the next day, which makes Algorithm 2 a practical approach. The same applies to Algorithm 1 discussed in Section IV also.
Since both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 require sequential update of the strategies, a natural concern may arise regarding the practicality of the algorithms for large population of consumers. For this scenario, users can be grouped based on their electricity consumption needs or geographical proximity or some other relevant condition, and the optimal solutions should be calculated for those groups. Within each group, a predefined scheduling scheme can be deployed or further optimizations can be carried out locally.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we show the convergence of Algorithms 1 and 2, and evaluate and compare the performance of the algorithms. The equilibrium of the game will certainly depend on the values of the parameters. Nonetheless, for the purpose of illustration, we use a certain set of parameters in all analyses in this section. Note that the value of the results may change with a different set of parameters, but the pattern of the results will be similar. We consider 30 users (N = 30) and 4 UCs (K = 4). UC 1 and 2 are fossil-fuel based, and UCs 3 and 4 are renewable energy based. We divide the daily consumption of users into 24 hours. The renewable energy based UCs have three states: state 1 is the OFF state i.e. no power available, state 2 means it has a power of 45 KW and state 3 means it has a power of 90 KW. The capacity of UCs 1 and 2 used for the analysis are P 1,max = P 2,max = 500KW .
Each user has some non-shiftable appliances such as refrigerators, bulbs, heating/cooling units, electric stoves, televisions, computers, etc., and some shiftable appliances such as dishwashers, laundry machines, electrical vehicles, Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), etc. The power requirement for these appliances are typical standard values, e.g., 1.32 -3.96 KWh for refrigerators (depending on the number of refrigerators a household has), 1-2 KWh for bulbs, 6.4-9.6 KWh for heating, 3.9 KWh for electric stoves, 1.1-2.0 KWh for televisions/computers, 1.44 KWh for a dishwasher, 3.43 KWh for a laundry machine and 9.9 KWh for PHEVs. The power requirement for the non-shiftable appliances was generated using a uniform random distribution over the typical values mentioned above. For UCs 1 and 2, we used β 1,2 = 0.3 cents, β 1,1 = β 1,0 = 0 as in [3] , and β 2,2 = 0.1 cents, β 2,1 = 0.5 cents, β 2,0 = 0 as in [18] . Similar values were assigned to the pollution coefficients, i.e.,
For the renewable energy based UCs, we considered β 3,2 = 0.1 cents, β 3,1 = 0.3 cents, β 3,0 = 0.3 cents, β 4,2 = 0.05 cents, β 4,1 = 0.3 cents, β 4,0 = 0.2 cents. unless otherwise stated. Note that we have chosen β 1,2 , β 2,2 ≥ β 3,2 , β 4,2 , and β 1,0 , β 2,0 β 3,0 , β 4,0 , assuming that the production cost is dominant for fossil-fuel based generators and the initial installation cost is higher for renewable energy sources. The transition probability matrix used for the numerical analysis is for both the renewable energy based UCs. We chose this matrix such that it is closely related to the transition probability matrix used in [10] , but we slightly modified the values since [10] employs the matrix for 2 states. Note that the transition probability matrix was chosen as above to illustrate the performance of the proposed schemes. Choosing different values for the two renewable energy based UCs may alter the cost values but the pattern of the results will persist. Fig. 3 depicts the daily cost paid by 10 randomly selected consumers (out of 30), and shows that Algorithm 1 converges. This figure represents the convergence of the cost for each user to the NE for a 24 hours period without using shiftable load. The convergence is within 3 iterations. Note that one iteration here means one round of strategy updating for all users. Fig. 4 depicts the daily cost for 10 randomly selected users with and without employing our optimal UCS strategy. It is evident that the cost decreases for each user when the UCS scheme is employed. E.g., for consumer 3, the daily cost reduces from 21.2 to 14, i.e., the UCS scheme results in an improvement of about 34% for this consumer.
A. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR UTILITY COMPANY SELECTION
B. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR UTILITY COMPANY SELECTION AND SHIFTABLE LOAD SCHEDULING
We added shiftable demands of 20 KWh to all the users such that each user needs this amount of energy within 5 hours. Each user schedules this demand in time. Fig. 5 shows the total cost for each user for a 24-hour period calculated using Algorithm 2. The figure shows that the algorithm converges very fast, in about 5 iterations. Note that one iteration here means one complete round of strategy updates for all consumers. Fig. 6 depicts the total cost for all users in a 24-hour period. The figure shows four curves. The curve with '+' markers is the cost when neither the optimal UCS nor the optimal SLS is employed. The dashed line shows the scheme where only optimal SLS is performed. The dotted line with square markers shows the performance of the UCS scheme. The solid line shows the performance of our joint scheme where both optimal SLS and optimal UCS are employed. The fourth curve (solid line) shows that Algorithm 2 converges within 5 iterations. We observe that the SLS and the UCS schemes reduce the cost compared to the case when no scheduling is done, from about 485$ to about 420$, and 280$, respectively, i.e., by 13.4% and 42.2%, respectively. Our joint scheme incurs the least total cost compared to the remaining three schemes. It reduces the cost paid by the users to about 230$, i.e., by 10 .3% compared to the UCS VOLUME 5, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2017 scheme, by 39.17% compared to the SLS scheme and by 52.5% compared to the scheme without using UCS and SLS. An interesting observation from this figure is that optimal UCS can yield drastic savings even for those consumers who do not have a big proportion of shiftable appliances, or those who prefer not to shift their appliances, if the consumers have the option to choose different providers or UCs. Fig. 7 shows the total daily cost paid by 10 randomly selected consumers with and without using the joint scheme. The figure clearly indicates that the daily cost is reduced significantly for every user. E.g., for consumer 3, the daily cost reduces from about 21.22$ to about 11.5$, a reduction of about 45.8%.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have formulated a utility company selection game, incorporating multiple renewable and non-renewable energy based utility companies. We have proved that there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game and have proposed a distributed algorithm that converges to the Nash equilibrium. Next, we improved the performance of our proposed scheme by integrating optimal load scheduling with it, using a twostage game framework for analysis. This is a novel approach exploiting both spatial and temporal dimensions for demand response management in the smart grid. We have proven the existence of a Nash equilibrium for this game also, and have developed a distributed algorithm that converges to the equilibrium. We have verified the convergence of the proposed algorithms and have shown that while the utility company selection scheme improves the costs for the users compared to the case without any scheduling, the joint scheme yields the lowest costs compared to three other schemes.
